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RELATING FIRST-ORDER SET THEORIES AND ELEMENTARY
TOPOSES
STEVE AWODEY, CARSTEN BUTZ, ALEX SIMPSON, AND THOMAS STREICHER
Abstract. We show how to interpret the language of first-order set theory in an
elementary topos endowed with, as extra structure, a directed structural system of
inclusions (dssi). As our main result, we obtain a complete axiomatization of the
intuitionistic set theory validated by all such interpretations. Since every elementary
topos is equivalent to one carrying a dssi, we thus obtain a first-order set theory whose
associated categories of sets are exactly the elementary toposes. In addition, we show
that the full axiom of Separation is validated whenever the dssi is superdirected. This
gives a uniform explanation for the known facts that cocomplete and realizability
toposes provide models for Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (IZF).
§1. Introduction. The notion of elementary topos abstracts from the
structure of the category of sets. The abstraction is sufficiently general
that elementary toposes encompass a rich collection of other very differ-
ent categories, including categories that have arisen in fields as diverse
as algebraic geometry, algebraic topology, mathematical logic, and com-
binatorics. Nonetheless, elementary toposes retain many of the essential
features of the category of sets. In particular, elementary toposes pos-
sess an internal logic, which is a form of higher-order type theory, see
e.g. [11, 13, 9]. This logic allows one to reason with objects of the topos
as if they were abstract sets in the sense of [12]; that is, as if they were
unstructured collections of elements. Although the reasoning supported
in this way is both powerful and natural, it differs in several respects from
the set-theoretic reasoning available in the familiar first-order set theories,
such as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF).
A first main difference between the internal logic and ZF is:
1. Except in the special case of boolean toposes, the underlying internal
logic of a topos is intuitionistic rather than classical.
Many toposes of mathematical interest are not boolean. Thus the use
of intuitionistic logic is unavoidable. Moreover, fields such as synthetic
differential geometry and synthetic domain theory demonstrate that the
non-validity of classical logic has mathematical applications. In these
areas, intuitionistic logic offers the opportunity of working consistently
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with convenient but classically inconsistent properties, such as the exis-
tence of nilpotent infinitesimals, or the existence of nontrivial sets over
which every endofunction has a fixed point.
Although the intuitionistic internal logic of toposes is a powerful tool,
there are potential applications of set-theoretic reasoning in toposes for
which it is too restrictive. This is due to a second main difference between
the internal logic and first-order set theories.
2. In first-order set theories, one can quantify over the class of all sets,
whereas, in the internal logic of a topos, every quantifier is bounded
by an object of a topos, i.e., by a set.
Sometimes, one would like to reason about mathematical structures de-
rived from the topos that are not “small”, and so cannot be considered
internally at all. For example, one often considers derived categories (e.g.,
the category of internal locales) that are not themselves small categories
from the viewpoint of the topos. The standard mathematical approach
to handling non-small categories relative to a topos is to invoke the ma-
chinery of fibrations (or the essentially equivalent machinery of indexed
categories). This paper provides the basis for an alternative approach.
We show how to conservatively extend the internal logic of a topos to ex-
plicitly permit direct set-theoretic reasoning about non-small structures.
To achieve this, we directly address issue 2 above, by embedding the in-
ternal logic in a first-order set theory within which one can quantify over
any class, including the class of all sets (i.e., the class of all objects of
the topos). In general, this extended logic should provide a useful tool
for establishing properties of non-small structures (e.g., large categories),
relative to a topos, using natural set-theoretic arguments. In fact, one
such application of our work has already appeared in [18].
In Section 2, we present the set theory that we shall interpret over
an arbitrary elementary topos (with natural numbers object), which we
call Basic Intuitionistic Set Theory (BIST). Although very natural, and
based on familiar looking set-theoretic axioms, there are several differ-
ences compared with standard formulations of intuitionistic set theories.
Two of the differences are minor: in BIST the universe may contain non-
sets (a.k.a. atoms or urelements) as well as sets, and non-well-founded
sets are permitted (though not obliged to exist). The essential difference
is the following.
3. BIST is a conservative extension of intuitionistic higher-order arith-
metic (HAH). In particular, by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theo-
rem, it cannot prove the consistency of HAH.
This property is unavoidable because we wish to faithfully embed the
internal logic of the free topos (with natural numbers object) in BIST,
and this logic is exactly HAH.
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Property 3 means that BIST is necessarily proof-theoretically weaker
than ZF That such weakness is necessary for interpreting first-order set
theory in toposes has long been recognised. The traditional account has
been that the appropriate set theory is bounded Zermelo (bZ) set theory
(also known as Mac Lane set theory [14]). which is ZF set theory with the
axiom of Replacement removed and with Separation restricted to bounded
(i.e. ∆0) formulas. The standard results connecting bZ set theory with
toposes run as follows. First, from any (ordinary first-order) model of
bZ one can construct a well-pointed (hence boolean) topos whose objects
are the elements of the model and whose internal logic expresses truth in
the model. Conversely, given any well-pointed topos E , certain “transitive
objects” can be identified, out of which a model of bZ can be constructed.
This model captures that part of the internal logic of E that pertains to
transitive objects. See, e.g., [13] for an account of this correspondence.
This standard story is unsatisfactory in several respects. First, it ap-
plies only to well-pointed (hence boolean) toposes. Second, the set theory
is only able to express properties of transitive objects in E , potentially
ignoring whole swathes of the topos. Third, with the absence of Replace-
ment, bZ is not a particularly convenient or natural set theory to reason
in, see [14] for a critique.
The set theory BIST introduced in Section 2 provides a far more satis-
factory connection with elementary toposes. We shall interpret BIST over
an arbitrary elementary topos (with natural numbers object) in such a
way that the class of all sets in the set theory can be understood as being
exactly the collection of all objects of the topos. Moreover, BIST turns
out to be a very natural theory in terms of the set-theoretic reasoning it
supports. In particular, one of its attractive features is that it contains
the full axiom of Replacement. Indeed, we shall even see that the stronger
axiom of Collection (Coll) is validated by our interpretation.
Some readers familiar with bZ set theory and its connection with toposes
may be feeling uncomfortable at this point. In bZ set theory, it is the
absence of Replacement and the restriction of Separation that weakens
the proof-theoretic strength of the set theory to be compatible with the
internal logic of elementary toposes. In BIST, however, we have full Re-
placement. For some readers, this might ring alarm bells. In classical set
theory, Replacement, which is equivalent to Collection and implies full
Separation, takes one beyond the the proof-theoretic strength of elemen-
tary toposes. The situation is completely different under intuitionistic
logic. Intuitionistically, as has long been known, the full axioms of Re-
placement and Collection are compatible with proof-theoretically weak
set theories, see, e.g., [15, 7, 1, 2]. Readers who are unfamiliar with this
phenomenon can find examples illustrating the situation in the discussion
at the end of Section 4.
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The precise connection between BIST and elementary toposes is elabo-
rated in Sections 3 and 4. In order to interpret unbounded quantification
over the class of all sets, we have to address a fourth difference between
the internal logic of toposes and first-order set theories.
4. In first-order set theories, one can compare the elements of different
sets for equality, whereas, in the internal logic of a topos, one can
only compare elements of the same object.
In Section 3, we consider additional structure on an elementary topos
that enables the comparison of (generalized) elements of different ob-
jects. This additional structure, a directed structural system of inclu-
sions (dssi), directly implements a well-behaved notion of subset relation
between objects of a topos, Although not particularly natural from a
category-theoretic point of view, the structure of a dssi turns out to be
exactly what is needed to obtain an interpretation of the full language
of first-order set theory in a topos, including unbounded quantification;
and thus indeed resolves issue 2 above. We present this interpretation in
Section 4, using a suitably defined notion of “forcing” over a dssi.
In fact, a special case of our forcing semantics for first-order set theory
in toposes was previously presented by Hayashi in [8], where the notion
of inclusion was provided by the canonical notion of inclusion map be-
tween the transitive objects in a topos. One benefit of our more general
axiomatic notion of dssi is that our logic is able to express properties of
arbitrary (non-transitive) objects of the topos. More substantially, we
considerably extend Hayashi’s results in three significant ways. First, as
mentioned above, we show that, for any elementary topos, the forcing
semantics always validates the full axiom of Collection (and hence Re-
placement). Thus we obtain a model of BIST plus Collection (henceforth
BIST+ Coll), which is a very natural set theory in its own right. Sec-
ond, we give correct conditions under which the full axiom of Separation
is modelled (BIST itself supports only a restricted separation principle).
Third, we obtain a completeness result (Theorem 4.2) which shows that
the theory BIST+ Coll axiomatizes exactly the set-theoretic properties
validated by our forcing semantics. This theorem, whose proof is by no
means routine, constitutes the major technical contribution of the present
work. It also fulfills a longstanding wish of Saunders Mac Lane, who often
expressed the desire to find a first-order set theory whose notion of set
corresponds to that given by elementary toposes.
In mathematical applications of topos theory, one is often interested
in “real world” toposes, such as Grothendieck and realizability toposes,
defined from the “external” category of sets (which we take to be ax-
iomatized by ZFC). It is known from previous work [6, 8, 10] that such
toposes are capable of interpreting Friedman’s IZF set theory, which is
proof-theoretically as strong as ZF. Thus, if one is primarily interested
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in such real world toposes, the above account is unsatisfactory in merely
detailing how to interpret the weak set theory BIST inside them.
To address this, in parallel with the development already described, we
further show how the approach discussed above adapts to model the full
Separation axiom (Sep) in toposes such as cocomplete and realizability
toposes. The appropriate structure we require for this task is a modifica-
tion of the notion of dssi from Section 3, extended by strengthening the
directedness property to require upper bounds for arbitrary (rather than
just finite) sets of objects. Given a topos with such a superdirected struc-
tural system of inclusions (sdssi), the forcing interpretation of Section 4
does indeed model the full Separation axiom. Since cocomplete toposes
and realizability toposes can all be endowed with sdssi’s, we thus obtain
a uniform explanation of why all such toposes model IZF (the set theory
BIST+ Coll+ Sep is intertranslatable with IZF). It seems that no such
uniform explanation was known before.
This article is an announcement of results taken from a forthcoming
paper [4], where proofs for all the results stated here can be found. That
paper contains, in addition, another major component not discussed here.
A second class of category-theoretic models of BIST is considered, based
on the idea of axiomatizing the category-theoretic structure of the cat-
egory of classes of BIST, following the lead of Joyal and Moerdijk’s Al-
gebraic Set Theory (AST) [10] and its subsequent refinements in [17, 5].
The details of the relevant category-theoretic models have been surveyed
in separate articles [19, 3], and are thus not included here. Nevertheless,
the class-category semantics of BIST discussed in [19, 3] is intimately
connected with the forcing semantics, and, moreover, is used as a crucial
element in the proof of Theorem 4.2 below. For details, see [4]. We re-
mark that there have been several further contributions to AST since the
results detailed in this announcement were first obtained, many building
on the approach of [4]. We refer the interested reader to the Algebraic
Set Theory website: http://www.cmu.edu/mobius/ast/.
§2. Basic Intuitionistic Set Theory (BIST) and extensions. All
first-order set theories considered in this announcement are built on top of
a basic theory, BIST (Basic Intuitionistic Set Theory). The axiomatiza-
tion of BIST is primarily motivated by the desire to find the most natural
first-order set theory under which an arbitrary elementary topos may be
considered as a category of sets. Nonetheless, BIST is also well motivated
as a set theory capturing basic principles of set-theoretic reasoning in
informal mathematics.
The axioms of BIST axiomatize properties of the intuitive idea of a
mathematical universe consisting of mathematical “objects”. The uni-
verse gives rise to notions of “class” and of “set”. Classes are arbitrary
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Membership y ∈ x → S(x)
Extensionality S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ (∀z. z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y) → x = y
Indexed-Union S(x) ∧ (∀y ∈ x. Sz. φ) → Sz.∃y ∈ x. φ
Emptyset Sz.⊥
Pairing Sz. z = x ∨ z = y
Equality Sz. z = x ∧ z = y
Powerset S(x) → Sy. y ⊆ x
Figure 1. Axioms for BIST−
Coll S(x) ∧ (∀y ∈ x.∃z. φ) →
∃w. (S(w) ∧ (∀y ∈ x.∃z ∈ w. φ) ∧ (∀z ∈ w.∃y ∈ x. φ) )
Figure 2. Collection axiom
collections of mathematical objects; whereas sets are collections that are,
in some sense, small. The important feature of sets is that they themselves
constitute mathematical objects belonging to the universe. The axioms
of BIST simply require that the collection of sets be closed under various
useful operations on sets, all familiar from mathematical practice. More-
over, in keeping with informal mathematical practice, we do not assume
that the only mathematical objects in existence are sets.
The set theory BIST is formulated as a theory in intuitionistic first-
order logic with equality.1 The language contains one unary predicate, S,
and one binary predicate, ∈. The formula S(x) expresses that x is a set.
The binary predicate is, of course, set membership.
Figure 1 presents the axioms for BIST−, which is BIST without the
axiom of infinity. All axioms are implicitly universally quantified over
their free variables. The axioms make use of the following notational
devices. As is standard, we write ∀x ∈ y. φ and ∃x ∈ y. φ as abbreviations
for the formulas ∀x. (x ∈ y → φ) and ∃x. (x ∈ y ∧ φ) respectively, and
we refer to the prefixes ∀x ∈ y and ∃x ∈ y as bounded quantifiers. In the
presence of non-sets, we define the subset relation, x ⊆ y, as abbreviating
S(x) ∧ S(y) ∧ ∀z ∈ x. z ∈ y .
This is important in the formulation of the Powerset axiom. We also use
the notation Sx. φ, which abbreviates
∃y. (S(y) ∧ ∀x. (x ∈ y ↔ φ)) ,
1As discussed in Section 1, the use of intuitionistic logic is essential for formulating
a set theory interpretable in any elementary topos.
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where y is a variable not occurring free in φ. Thus Sx. φ states that
the class {x | φ} forms a set. Equivalently, Scan be understood as the
generalized quantifier “there are set-many”.
Often we shall consider BIST− together with the axiom of Collection,
presented in Figure 2.2 One reason for not including Collection as one of
the axioms of BIST− is that it seems better to formulate the results that
do not require Collection for a basic theory without it. Another is that
Collection has a different character from the other axioms in asserting the
existence of a set that is not uniquely characterized by the properties it
is required to satisfy.
There are three main non-standard ingredients in the axioms of BIST−.
The first is the Indexed-Union axiom, which is taken from [2] (where it is
called Union-Rep). In the presence of the other axioms, Indexed-Union
combines the familiar axioms below,
Union S(x) ∧ (∀y ∈ x.S(y)) → Sz.∃y ∈ x. z ∈ y ,
Replacement S(x) ∧ (∀y ∈ x.∃!z. φ) → Sz.∃y ∈ x. φ ,
into one simple axiom, which is also in a form that is convenient to use. We
emphasise that there is no restriction on the formulas φ allowed to appear
in Indexed-Union. This means that BIST− supports the full Replacement
schema above. The second non-standard feature of BIST− is the inclusion
of an explicit Equality axiom. This is to permit the third non-standard
feature, the absence of any Separation axiom. In the presence of the
other axioms, including Equality and Indexed-Union (full Replacement
is crucial), this turns out not to be a major weakness. As we shall see
below, many instances of Separation are derivable in BIST−.
First, we establish notation for working with BIST−. As is standard,
we make free use of derived constants and operations: writing ∅ for the
emptyset, {x} and {x, y} for a singleton and pair respectively, and x∪y for
the union of two sets x and y. We write δxy for the set {z | z = x∧z = y}.
It follows from the Equality and Indexed-Union axioms that, for sets x
and y, the intersection x ∩ y is a set, because x ∩ y =
⋃
z∈x
⋃
w∈y δzw.
We now study Separation in BIST−. By an instance of Separation, we
mean a formula of the form3
φ[x, y]-Sep S(x) → Sy. (y ∈ x ∧ φ) ,
2Coll, in this form, is often called Strong Collection, because of the extra clause
∀z ∈ w.∃y ∈ x. φ, which is not present in the Collection axiom as usually formulated.
The inclusion of the additional clause is necessary in set theories, like BIST−, that do
not have full Separation.
3We write φ[x, y] to mean a formula φ with the free variables x and y (which may
or may not occur in φ) distinguished. Moreover, once we have distinguished x and y,
we write φ[t, u] for the formula φ[t/x, u/y]. Note that φ is permitted to contain free
variables other than x, y.
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which states that the subclass {y ∈ x | φ} of x is actually a subset of
x. We write Sep for the full Separation schema: φ[x, y]-Sep for all φ.
Although the full Sep schema is not derivable in BIST−, many instances
of it are. To see this, as in [2], we analyse the formulas φ for which the
corresponding instances of Separation are derivable. For any formula φ,
we write !φ to abbreviate the following special case of Separation
Sz. (z = ∅ ∧ φ) ,
where z is not free in φ. We read !φ as stating that the property φ
is restricted.4 The utility of the concept is given by the lemma below,
showing that the notion of restrictedness exactly captures when a property
can be used in an instance of Separation.
Lemma 2.1. BIST− ⊢ (∀y ∈ x. !φ) ↔ φ[x, y]-Sep .
We next state important closure properties of restricted propositions.
Lemma 2.2. The following all hold in BIST−.
1. !(x = y).
2. If S(x) then !(y ∈ x).
3. If !φ and !ψ then !(φ ∧ ψ), !(φ ∨ ψ), !(φ→ ψ) and !(¬φ).
4. If S(x) and ∀y ∈ x. !φ then !(∀y ∈ x. φ) and !(∃y ∈ x. φ).
5. If φ ∨ ¬φ then !φ.
The following immediate corollary gives a useful class of instances of
Separation that are derivable in BIST−.
Corollary 2.3. Suppose that φ[x1, . . . , xk] is a formula containing no
atomic subformula of the form S(z) and such that every quantifier is
bounded and of the form ∀y ∈ xi or ∃y ∈ xi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then
BIST− ⊢ S(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ S(xk) → !φ .
At this point, it is convenient to develop further notation. Any formula
φ[x] determines a class {x | φ}, which is a set just if Sx. φ. Given a class
A = {x | φ}, we write y ∈ A for φ[y], and we use relative quantifiers
∀x ∈ A and ∃x ∈ A in the obvious way.
Given two classes A and B, we write A×B for the product class:
{p | ∃x ∈ A.∃y ∈ B. p = (x, y)} ,
where (x, y) = {{x}, {x, y}} is the standard Kuratowski pairing construc-
tion. Using Indexed-Union, one can prove that if A and B are both sets
then so is A×B. Similarly, we write A+B for the coproduct class
{p | (∃x ∈ A. p = ({x}, ∅)) ∨ (∃y ∈ B. p = (∅, {y}))} .
4The terminology “restricted” is sometimes used to refer to formulas in which all
quantifiers are bounded. We instead use “bounded” for the latter syntactic condition.
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Inf ∃I.∃0 ∈ I.∃s ∈ II . (∀x ∈ I. s(x) 6= 0) ∧
(∀x, y ∈ I. s(x) = s(y) → x = y)
vN-Inf ∃I. (∅ ∈ I ∧ ∀x ∈ I.S(x) ∧ x ∪ {x} ∈ I)
Figure 3. Infinity axioms
Given a set x, we write Ax for the class
{f | S(f) ∧ (∀p ∈ f. p ∈ x×A) ∧ (∀y ∈ x.∃!z. (y, z) ∈ f)}
of all functions from x to A. By the Powerset axiom, if A is a set then so
is Ax. We shall use standard notation for manipulating functions.
We next turn to the axiom of Infinity. As we are permitting non-sets in
the universe, there is no reason to require the individual natural numbers
themselves to be sets. Infinity is thus formulated as in Figure 3. Define
BIST = BIST−+ Inf .
For the sake of comparison, we also include, in Figure 3, the familiar
von Neumann axiom of Infinity, which does make assumptions about the
nature of the elements of the assumed infinite set. It will follow from the
results of Section 4 that:
Proposition 2.4. BIST+ Coll 6⊢ vN-Inf .
It is instructive to construct the set of natural numbers in BIST and to
derive its induction principle. The axiom of Infinity gives us an infinite
set I together with an element 0 and a function s. We define N to be the
intersection of all subsets of I containing 0 and closed under s. By the
Powerset axiom and Lemma 2.2, N is a set. This definition of the natural
numbers determines N up to isomorphism.
There is a minor clumsiness inherent in the way we have formulated
the Infinity axiom and derived the natural numbers from it. Since the
infinite structure (I, 0, s) is not uniquely characterized by the Infinity
axiom, there is no definite description for N available in our first-order
language. The best we can do is use the formula Nat(N, 0, s):
0 ∈ N ∧ s ∈ NN ∧ (∀x ∈ N. s(x) 6=0) ∧ (∀x, y ∈ N. s(x)=s(y) → x=y)
∧ ∀X ∈ PN. (0 ∈ X ∧ (∀x. x ∈ X → s(x) ∈ X)) → X = N ,
where N, 0, s are variables, to assert that (N, 0, s) forms a legitimate nat-
ural numbers structure. Henceforth, for convenience, we shall sometimes
state that some property ψ, mentioning N, 0, s, is derivable in BIST. In
doing so, what we really mean is that the formula
∀N, 0, s. (Nat(N, 0, s) → ψ)
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DE Decidable Equality x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)
REM Restricted Excluded Middle (!φ) → (φ ∨ ¬φ)
LEM Law of Excluded Middle φ ∨ ¬φ
Figure 4. Excluded middle axioms
is derivable in BIST. Thus, informally, we treat N, 0, s as if they were
constants added to the language and we treat Nat(N, 0, s) as if it were an
axiom. The reader may wonder why we do not simply add such constants
and assume Nat(N, 0, s) (instead of our axiom of Infinity) and hence avoid
the fuss. Our reason for not doing so is that, in Section 4, we consider
semantic models of the first-order language and we should like it to be a
property of such models whether or not they validate the axiom of Infinity.
This is the case with Infinity as we have formulated it, but would not be
the case if it were formulated using additional constants, which would
require extra structure on the models.
For a formula φ[x], the induction principle for φ is
φ[x]-Ind φ[0] ∧ (∀x ∈ N.φ[x] → φ[s(x)]) → ∀x ∈ N.φ[x] .
We write Ind for the full induction principle, φ-Ind for all formulas φ, and
we RInd for Restricted Induction:
RInd (∀x ∈ N. !φ) → φ[x]-Ind .
Lemma 2.5. BIST ⊢ RInd.
As induction holds for restricted properties, by Lemma 2.1, we have:
Corollary 2.6. BIST+ Sep ⊢ Ind .
Figure 4 contains three other axioms that we shall consider adding to
our theories. LEM is the full Law of the Excluded Middle, REM is its re-
striction to restricted formulas and DE (the axiom of Decidable Equality)
its restriction to equalities. The latter two turn out to be equivalent.
Lemma 2.7. In BIST−, axioms DE and REM are equivalent.
Henceforth, we consider only REM. Of course, properties established
for REM also hold inter alia for DE.
Proposition 2.8. BIST−+ LEM ⊢ Sep .
Corollary 2.9. BIST−+ Sep+ REM = BIST−+ LEM.
In the sequel, we shall show how to interpret the theories BIST+ Coll
in any elementary topos with natural numbers object. Also, we shall
interpret BIST+Coll+REM in any boolean topos with natural numbers
object. From these results, we shall deduce
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Proposition 2.10. BIST+ Coll+ REM 6⊢ Con(HAH) ,
where Con(HAH) is the Π01 formula asserting the consistency of Higher-
order Heyting Arithmetic [20]. Indeed, this proposition is a consequence
of the conservativity of our interpretation of BIST+ Coll+ REM over
the internal logic of boolean toposes, see Proposition 4.6 and surrounding
discussion. On the other hand,
Proposition 2.11. BIST+ Ind ⊢ Con(HAH) .
Corollary 2.12. If any of the schemas Ind, Sep or LEM are added
to BIST then Con(HAH) is derivable. Hence, none of these schemas is
derivable in BIST+ Coll+ REM.
Note that, in each case, the restriction of the schema to restricted prop-
erties is derivable.
Proposition 2.10 shows that BIST+ Coll is considerably weaker than
ZF set theory. As well as BIST, we shall also be interested in the theory:
IST = BIST+ Sep ,
introduced in [17]. The theory IST is intertranslatable with Friedman’s
Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, in its version IZFR with Re-
placement rather than Collection, see [16]. Similarly, IST+ Coll is inter-
translatable with full IZF itself.
We end this section with a brief discussion about the relationship be-
tween BIST and other intuitionistic set theories in the literature. None of
the existing literature on weak set theories interpretable in arbitrary ele-
mentary toposes includes unrestricted Replacement or Collection axioms
in such theories. In having such principles, our set theories are similar to
the “constructive” set theories of Myhill, Friedman and Aczel [15, 7, 1, 2].
However, because of our acceptance of the Powerset axiom, none of the
set theories discussed above are “constructive” in the predicative sense in-
tended by these authors.5 In fact, in comparison with Aczel’s CZF [1, 2],
the theory BIST+Coll represents both a strengthening and a weakening.
It is a strengthening because it has the Powerset axiom, and this indeed
amounts to a strengthening in terms of proof-theoretic strength. However,
the full Ind schema is derivable in Aczel’s CZF, but not in BIST+ Coll.
§3. Toposes and systems of inclusions. In this section we intro-
duce the categories we shall use as models of BIST− and its extensions.
For us, a category K will always be locally small, i.e. the collection of ob-
jects |K| forms a (possibly proper) class, but the collection of morphisms
K(A,B), between any two objects A,B, forms a set. We write Set for the
category of sets. Of course all this needs to be understood relative to some
5For us, Powerset is unavoidable because we are investigating set theories associated
with elementary toposes, where powerobjects are a basic ingredient of the structure.
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meta-theory supporting a class/set distinction. To keep matters simple
in this announcement, our meta-theory throughout is ZFC. Of course, it
is somewhat unsatisfactory to use an over-powerful meta-theory such as
ZFC to study models of proof-theoretically weak set theories like BIST.
Such meta-theoretic concerns are handled with more care in the full ver-
sion of the paper [4].
To fix notation, we briefly recall that an (elementary) topos is a category
E with finite limits and with powerobjects:
Definition 3.1. A category E with finite limits has powerobjects if, for
every object B there is an object P(B) and a mono ∋B- - P(B)×B
such that, for every mono R-
r- A × B there exists a unique map
χr : A - P(B) fitting into a pullback diagram:
R - ∋B
A×B
?
?
χr × 1B
- P(B)×B
?
?
The intuitive reading of the above data is that objects are sets, the power-
object P(B) is the powerset of B, and ∋B is the membership relation.
We shall always assume that toposes come with specified structure, i.e.
we have specified binary products A ﬀ
pi1
A×B
pi2- B, specified terminal
object 1, a specified equalizer for every parallel pair, and specified data
providing the powerobject structure as above.
Any morphism f : A - B in a topos factors (uniquely up to isomor-
phism) as an epi followed by a mono
f = A -- Im(f)- - B .
Thus, given f : A - B, we can factor the composite on the left below,
to obtain the morphisms on the right.
∋A- - P(A)×A
1P(A)×f- P(A)×B = ∋A -- Rf-
rf- P(A)×B
By the definition of powerobjects, we obtain χrf : P(A) → P(B). We
write Pf : P(A)→ P(B) for χrf . Intuitively, the morphism Pf represents
the direct-image function determined by f . Its definition is independent
of the choice of factorization. The operations A 7→ PA and f 7→ Pf
are the actions on objects and morphisms respectively of the covariant
powerobject functor.
We wish to interpret the first-order language of Section 2 in any elemen-
tary topos E . In fact, the topos E alone does not determine a canonical
such interpretation. Thus the interpretation needs to be defined with
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reference to additional structure on E . The required extra structure, a
directed structural system of inclusions (dssi), is a collection of special
maps, “inclusions”, intended to implement a “subset” relation between
objects of the topos. The situation is summarised by the equation:
model of BIST− = elementary topos E + dssi on E .(1)
In the remainder of this section, we introduce and analyse the required
notion of dssi.
Definition 3.2 (System of inclusions). A system of inclusions on a
category K is a subcategory I (the inclusion maps, denoted ⊂ - )
satisfying the four conditions below.
(si1): Every inclusion is a monomorphism in K.
(si2): There is at most one inclusion between any two objects of K.
(si3): For every mono P-
m- A inK there exists an inclusionAm ⊂ - A
that is isomorphic to m (in the slice category K/A).
(si4): Given a commuting diagram, with i, j inclusions,
A′ ⊂
i - A
A′′
m
6
⊂
j
-
(2)
then m (which is necessarily a mono) is an inclusion.
We shall always assume that systems of inclusions come with a specified
means of finding Am ⊂ - A from m in fulfilling (si3). By (si3), every
object of K is an object of I, hence every identity morphism in K is an
inclusion. By (si2), the objects of I are preordered by inclusions. We
write A ≡ B if A ⊂ - B ⊂ - A. If A ⊂
i- B then A ≡ B iff i is
an isomorphism, in which case i−1 is the inclusion from B to A. We do
not assume that inclusions form a partial order since there is no gain in
convenience by doing so.
When working with an elementary topos E with a specified system
of inclusions I, we always take the image factorization of a morphism
A
f- B in E to be of the form
A
f- B = A
ef-- Im(f) ⊂
if- B ,
i.e. an epi followed by an inclusion, using (si3) to obtain such an image.
Definition 3.3 (Directed system of inclusions). A system of inclusions
I on a category K (with at least one object) is said to be directed if the
induced preorder on I is directed (i.e. if, for any pair objects A,B, there
exists a specified object CAB with A ⊂ - CAB ﬀ ⊃ B).
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Definition 3.4 (Structural system of inclusions). A system of inclu-
sions I on an elementary topos E is said to be structural if it satisfies the
conditions below relating inclusions to the specified structure on E .
(ssi1): For any parallel pair A
f-
g
- B, the specified equalizer E- - A
is an inclusion.
(ssi2): For all inclusions A′ ⊂
i- A and B′ ⊂
j- B, the specified prod-
uct A′ ×B′-
i×j- A×B is an inclusion.
(ssi3): For every object A, the membership mono ∋A- - P(A)× A
is an inclusion.
(ssi4): For every inclusionA′ ⊂
i- A, the direct-image map PA′-
Pi- PA
is an inclusion.
The structure we shall require to interpret the first-order language of
Section 2 is a directed structural system of inclusions (henceforth dssi).
We make some observations concerning the existence of dssis. First, we
observe that not every topos can have a dssi placed upon it. For a simple
counterexample, consider the full subcategory of Set whose objects are
the cardinals. This is a topos, as it is equivalent to Set itself. However,
it can have no system of inclusions placed upon it. Indeed, if there were
a system of inclusions, then, by condition (si3) of Definition 3.2, each of
the two morphisms 1 - 2 would have to be an inclusion, thus violating
condition (si2). Since subset inclusions give a (partially-ordered) dssi on
Set, we see that the existence of a dssi is not preserved under equivalence
of categories. Nevertheless, our first main result is that every topos is
equivalent to one carrying a dssi.
Theorem 3.5. Given a topos E, there exists an equivalent category E ′
carrying a dssi I ′ relative to specified topos structure on E ′.
To end this section, we discuss the extra structure we shall require to
interpret IST and other set theories with full Separation.
Definition 3.6 (Superdirected system of inclusions). A system of in-
clusions I on K is said to be superdirected if, for every set A of objects of
K, there exists an object B that is an upper bound for A in I.
The structure we shall require to interpret set theories with full Separa-
tion is a superdirected structural system of inclusions (henceforth sdssi).
Proposition 3.7. If E is a small topos with an sdssi then, for every
object A, it holds that A ≡ 1, hence every object is isomorphic to 1.
Thus sdssi’s are only interesting on locally small toposes whose objects
form a proper class. The final two results of this section show that sdssi’s
are available on important classes of toposes from the literature.
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X ρ S(x) iff there exists B with Ix ⊂ - PB
X ρ x = y iff there exists B with Ax ⊂
ix- B ﬀ
iy
⊃ Ay
such that ix ◦ ρx = iy ◦ ρy
X ρ x ∈ y iff there exist inclusions Ix ⊂
i- B and Iy ⊂
j- PB such
that X
〈j ◦ ey , i ◦ ex〉- PB ×B factors through ∋B
X ρ ⊥ iff X is an initial object
X ρ φ ∧ ψ iff X ρ φ and X ρ ψ
X ρ φ ∨ ψ iff there exist jointly epic Y
s- X and Z
t- X
such that Y ρ◦s φ and Z ρ◦t ψ
X ρ φ→ ψ iff for all Y
t- X, Y ρ◦t φ implies Y ρ◦t ψ
X ρ ∀x. φ iff for all Y
t- X and Y
a- A, Y (ρ◦t)[a/x] φ
X ρ ∃x. φ iff there exists an epi Y
t-- X and map Y
a- A
such that Y (ρ◦t)[a/x] φ
Figure 5. The forcing relation
Theorem 3.8. For any cocomplete topos E, there is an equivalent cat-
egory E ′ carrying an sdssi I ′ relative to specified topos structure on E ′.
In particular, any Grothendieck topos can (up to equivalence) be endowed
with an sdssi.
Theorem 3.9. For any realizability topos E, there is an equivalent cat-
egory E ′ carrying an sdssi I ′ relative to specified topos structure on E ′.
§4. Interpreting set theory in a topos with inclusions. In this
section we present the interpretation of the first-order language of Sec-
tion 2 in an arbitrary elementary topos with dssi. This interpretation
always validates the axioms of BIST−+ Coll. In addition, the axiom of
Infinity (hence BIST+Coll) is validated if and only if the topos has a nat-
ural numbers object. Also, Restricted Excluded Middle is validated if and
only if the topos is boolean. Furthermore, all the theories covered above
are complete with respect to validity in the appropriate class of models.
Finally, in the case that the dssi is superdirected, full Separation, hence
the theory IST, is validated.
Let E be an arbitrary elementary topos with dssi I. The interpreta-
tion of the first-order language is similar to the well-known Kripke-Joyal
semantics of the Mitchell-Be´nabou language, cf. [13], but with two main
differences. First, we have to interpret the untyped relations x = y, S(x)
and x ∈ y. Second, we have to interpret unbounded quantification. To
address these issues, we make essential use of the inclusion structure on
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E . In doing so, we closely follow Hayashi [8], who interpreted the ordinary
language of first-order set theory using the canonical inclusions between
so-called transitive objects in E . The difference in our case is that we
work with an arbitrary dssi on E . See Section 1 for further comparison.
We interpret a formula φ(x1, . . . , xk) (i.e. with at most x1, . . . , xk free)
relative to the following data: an object X of E , a “world”; and an “X-
environment” ρ mapping each free variable x ∈ {x1, . . . , xk} to a mor-
phism X
ρx- Ax in E . We write X ρ φ for the associated “forcing”
relation, which is defined inductively in Figure 5. In the definition, we
use the notation X
ex-- Ix ⊂
ix- Ax for the epi-inclusion factorization of
ρx. Also, given Y
t- X, we write ρ ◦ t for the Y -environment mapping
x to ρx ◦ t. Similarly, given morphisms Ax
bx- Bx, for each free variable
x, we write b ◦ ρ for the X-environment mapping x to bx ◦ ρx. Finally,
given a variable x /∈ {x1, . . . , xk}, and a morphism a : X - Ax, we
write ρ[a/x] for the environment that agrees with ρ on {x1, . . . , xk}, and
which also maps x to a.
The next lemma gives a direct formulation of the derived forcing con-
ditions for the various set-theoretic abbreviations used in Section 2.
Lemma 4.1. If Iz ⊂
k- PC then
X ρ ∀x ∈ z. φ iff for all Y
t′- X and Y
s′- C, if
Y
(k ◦ ez ◦ t′, s′)- PC × C factors through ∋C
then Y (ρ◦t′)[s′/x] φ
X ρ ∃x ∈ z. φ iff there exists an epi Y
t-- X and map Y
s- C
such that Y
(k ◦ ez ◦ t, s)- PC × C factors
through ∋C and Y (ρ◦t)[s/x] φ
X ρ x ⊆ y iff there exists B such that Ix ⊂
i- PB ﬀ
j
⊃ Iy
and (i ◦ ex, j ◦ ey) : X - PB × PB factors
through ⊆B ⊂ - PB × PB
X ρ Sx. φ iff there exist objects B and R ⊂ - X ×B such that,
for all A and maps Y
t- X and Y
s- A,
Y (ρ◦t)[s/x] φ iff Im(p) ⊂ - R,
where p = 〈t, s〉 : Y - X ×A.
X ρ !φ iff the family {Y | Y ⊂
i- X and Y ρ◦i φ} has a
greatest element under inclusion.
For a sentence φ, we write (E , I) |= φ to mean that, for all worlds X, it
holds that X  φ (equivalently that 1 |= φ). Similarly, for a theory (i.e.
set of sentences T ), we write (E , I) |= T to mean that (E , I) |= φ, for all
φ ∈ T . The theorem below is the main result of this announcement.
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Theorem 4.2 (Soundness and completeness). For any theory T and
sentence φ, the following are equivalent.
1. BIST−+Coll + T ⊢ φ.
2. (E , I) |= φ, for every topos E and dssi I satisfying (E , I) |= T .
Soundness can be proved in the expected way by unwinding the forcing
semantics and checking the validity of the axioms one by one. The details
are surprisingly involved. The proof of completeness makes essential use
of an alternative category-theoretic account of models of BIST, using an
appropriately axiomatized notion of “category of classes”, adapting earlier
work on Algebraic Set Theory [10, 17, 5]. For the (lengthy) details, see [4].
The following two propositions can be used in combination with Theo-
rem 4.2 to obtain sound and complete classes of models for extensions of
the theory BIST−+Coll with Inf and/or REM.
Proposition 4.3. (E , I) |= Inf iff E has a natural numbers object.
Proposition 4.4. (E , I) |= REM iff E is a boolean topos.
Proposition 4.4 has the consequence that the underlying logic of the
first-order set theories that we associate with boolean toposes is not clas-
sical. Such set theories always satisfy the restricted law of excluded mid-
dle REM, but not in general the full law LEM. Such “semiclassical” set
theories have appeared elsewhere in the literature on intuitionistic set
theories, see e.g. [16]. Here, as in [8], we find them arising naturally as a
consequence of our forcing semantics.
The next result states that, in the presence of a superdirected system
of inclusions, the full Separation schema is validated.
Proposition 4.5. If I is an sdssi on E then (E , I) |= Sep.
Since BIST+Sep+Coll interprets IZF, we now, by Theorems 3.8 and 3.9,
have the promised uniform explanation for why all Grothendieck and
realizability toposes provide models of IZF.
In contrast to the characterizations of Inf and REM, Proposition 4.5
only establishes a sufficient condition for the validity of full Separation.
Indeed, there seems no reason to expect BIST−+Coll+Sep to be complete
axiomatization of the valid sentences with respect to toposes with sdssi’s.
We next consider a further important aspect about the forcing seman-
tics of the first-order language, its conservativity over the internal logic
of E . In order to fully express this, using the tools of the present section,
one would need to add constants to the first-order language for the global
points in E , interpret these in the evident way in the forcing semantics,
and give a laborious translation of the typed internal language of E into
first-order set theory augmented with the constants. In principle, all this
is routine. In practice, it would be tedious. Rather than pursuing this
18 STEVE AWODEY, CARSTEN BUTZ, ALEX SIMPSON, AND THOMAS STREICHER
line any further, we instead refer the reader to the full paper [4], where
the tools of categorical logic are used to express the desired conservativity
property in more natural terms. At this point, we simply remark on one
important consequence of the general conservativity result.
Proposition 4.6. Suppose E has a natural numbers object. Then for
any first-order sentence φ in the language of arithmetic, E |= φ in the
internal logic of E if and only if (E , I) |= φ in the forcing semantics
(using the natural translation of φ in each case).
Proposition 2.10 follows as a consequence of the above result, by an ap-
plication of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem.
We end this announcement with further simple applications of the
soundness theorem to obtain non-derivability results. Let A be any set.
For each ordinal α, we construct the von-Neumann hierarchy Vα(A) rel-
ative to A as a set of atoms in the standard way, viz :
Vα+1(A) = A+ P(Vα(A))
Vλ(A) =
⋃
α<λ
Vα(A) λ a limit ordinal.
Note that V0 = ∅, and α ≤ β implies Vα(A) ⊆ Vβ(A). We write V (A) for
the unbounded hierarchy
⋃
α Vα(A).
For a limit ordinal λ > 0, we define the category Vλ(A) to have subsets
X ⊆ Vα(A), for any α < λ, as objects, and arbitrary functions as mor-
phisms. It is readily checked that Vλ(A) is a boolean topos. Moreover,
subset inclusions provide a dssi on Vλ(A) relative to the naturally given
topos structure. In the propositions below, we omit explicit mention of
the inclusion maps, which are always taken to be subset inclusions.
Proposition 4.7.
1. Vλ(A) |= Inf if and only if λ > ω or |A| ≥ ℵ0.
2. Vλ(A) |= vN-Inf if and only if λ > ω.
In particular, Vω(N) |= Inf but Vω(N) 6|= vN-Inf. Proposition 2.4
follows as an immediate consequence. In fact, more generally:
Corollary 4.8. BIST+ Coll+ REM 6⊢ vN-Inf .
By Proposition 4.7, we have that Vω+ω(∅) |= vN-Inf. Hence, Vω+ω(∅)
is a model of BIST+ Coll+ REM+ vN-Inf. Examples such as this may
run contrary to the expectations of readers familiar with the standard
model theory of set theory, where, in order to model Replacement and
Collection, it is necessary to consider cumulative hierarchies Vλ(A) with λ
a strongly inaccessible cardinal. The difference in our setting is that our
forcing semantics builds Collection directly into its interpretation of the
existential quantifier. The “price” one pays for this is that the underlying
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logic of the set theory is intuitionistic. In consequence, the standard
arguments using Replacement that take one outside of Vλ(A) for λ non-
inaccessible, are not reproducible. For example, attempts to construct the
union of the chain N,P(N),P2(N), . . . founder at it being impossible to
define this chain inside the set theory, as the modelVω+ω(∅) demonstrates.
Indeed, although Vω+ω(∅) is a model of BIST+ Coll+ REM+ vN-Inf, it
does not model Ind (thus LEM and Sep are also invalidated).
Finally, we remark that the full hierarchy V(∅) models full Separation,
by Proposition 4.5. Hence, by Corollary 2.9, the category V(∅) is a model
of the theory IST+Coll+LEM. In fact, making use of Collection in ZFC
to unwind the forcing semantics, it is straightforward to show that the
forcing semantics in V(∅) simply expresses meta-theoretic truth in ZFC.
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